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Panel III: Restructuring Professional 
Sports Leagues 
 
Moderator:    Martin Edel1 
Panelists:      Jamin Dershowitz2 
                     Jeffrey Kessler3 
                     Tandy ODonoghue4 
                     Kenneth Shropshire5  
 
MS. COHEN: Our third and final panel is Restructuring 
Professional Sports Leagues.  I will provide you with a brief 
summary. 
With the exception of baseball for certain subjects,6 all sports 
leagues must adhere to the requirements of section 1 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.7  Baseball is one sport that has been immune from 
antitrust scrutiny since the holding of Federal Baseball Club v. 
National League.8  The way professional sports leagues are 
structured can determine whether or not a professional sports league 
will be subject to antitrust scrutiny. 
The founders of Major League Soccer (hereinafter MLS) 
developed their league as a single entity.  On April 19, 2000, in 
                                                          
 1 Partner, Miller & Wrubel P.C.  B.A., Columbia College, 1972; J.D., Harvard Law 
School, 1975. 
 2 General Counsel, Womens National Basketball Association (WNBA).  B.A., 
University of Pennsylvania, 1985; J.D., Yale Law School, 1988. 
 3 Partner, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP.  B.A., Columbia College, 1975; J.D., 
Columbia Law School, 1977. 
 4 Associate, Proskauer Rose LLP.  B.S., Cornell University, 1994; J.D., Tulane 
University School of Law, 1997. 
 5 Professor and Chairperson of Legal Studies, Wharton School of Business, University 
of Pennsylvania.  B.A., Stanford University, 1977; J.D., Columbia Law School, 1980. 
 6 See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Natl League of Profl Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 
200 (1922); see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 
346 U.S. 356 (1953) (affirming baseballs exemption from federal antitrust regulation). 
 7 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2001). 
 8 259 U.S. 200 (1922). 
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deciding the case of Fraser v. Major League Soccer L.L.C.,9 Judge 
OToole of the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts held that as a single entity, Major League Soccer 
could not violate section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.10 
Our panelists will address the various factors affecting the leagues 
existence as a single entity, as well as the added responsibilities that 
must be undertaken by a single entity in the negotiation of media and 
player contracts. 
Our third and final panel will be moderated by Mr. Martin Edel.  
Mr. Edel is a Partner at Miller & Wrubel.  He is also an Adjunct 
Associate Professor of Sports Law at Brooklyn Law School.  In 
1999, he became the Chairperson of the Sports Law Committee for 
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and was also a 
member of the Associations Antitrust Law Committee. 
Mr. Edel is a member of the New York State and American Bar 
Associations.  From 1975 until 1978 he was an Associate at Cravath, 
Swaine & Moore. 
Mr. Edel received his B.A. from Columbia College in 1972, 
Summa Cum Laude and Phi Beta Kappa.  In 1975, he received his 
Juris Doctor from Harvard Law School, where he earned the Boykin 
C. Wright Award and was an Editor of the Civil Rights-Civil 
Liberties Law Review. 
And now, on to our third and final panel, Mr. Edel. 
MR. EDEL: Thank you, Jessica.  I hadnt remembered half of my 
biography, so I was glad that you could refresh my recollection with 
it. 
We have today what I think is one of the showcase programs of 
this or any other symposium, which is the concept of restructuring 
sports leagues.  That is a bit of a misnomer, because I am not aware 
of any league that has been restructured.  What we have had, though, 
in the past decade is a number of new leagues that have come into 
existence that have adopted a new structure, sometimes called the 
                                                          
 9 97 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass. 2000).   
 10 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2001). 
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single-entity structure, because of advantages that the league 
perceives it has in terms of player relations, dealing with the media, 
dealing with vendors, and sometimes even dealing among the 
investors, who were formerly known as owners. 
I am particularly delighted to moderate this panel because we have 
such a very outstanding panel for you this afternoon.  All of the 
people on our paneland this is sort of an all-star grouping of 
panelists who we have here todayhave written, argued, or lived 
through the single-entity concept in some detail. 
I will just spend a moment or two reflecting on what the single-
entity concept is.  It is a concept that was rejected by the courts in the 
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, but began to receive some grudging 
acceptance at the beginning of the 1990s, particularly by the Seventh 
Circuit in the Chicago Bulls11 case, and has become the new model 
for, I think, all new sports leagues that have come into existence 
since the mid- or early 1990s. 
More recently, as you heard Jessica talk about, in Boston, Judge 
OToole approved the format of a single-entity league and its 
immunity from section 1 of the Sherman Act because, as I am sure 
all of you remember from reading section 1 of the Sherman Act, as a 
single entity, you lack at least two entities and, therefore, there can 
be no contract, combination, or conspiracy in unlawful restraint of 
trade.12 
Why would a league move to a single-entity model?  We will hear 
some discussion from the panel and we will be able to take your 
questions on it later. 
Just as a brief overview, one, of course, is to insulate the leagues 
from antitrust liability under section 1 of the Sherman Act.  There is 
still the question of section 2, which Judge OToole did not address 
in his  decision  but  was  the  subject of a ten-week trial this past fall  
                                                          
 11 Chi. Profl Sports Ltd. Pship v. Natl Basketball Assn, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(recognizing that the NBA might be a single entity for some purposes and not for others). 
 12 Fraser, 97 F. Supp. 2d 130. 
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and winter.13  We have two participants on our panel who were 
engaged in that trial. 
There is the question of unity of interests among the investors in 
the league: How they can deal with vendors in securing better 
contracts, if that is possible; and how they can deal with the media in 
the same way.  In terms of player relations, have we tilted the 
playing field by removing the antitrust weapon from the players 
under the single-entity model?  Is the single-entity model a viable 
way of proceeding? 
I will leave that to the panel, and you will hear from the panel the 
enormous consequences of shifting from what has been called the 
traditional model to a single-entity model. 
We have a very distinguished panel.  Let me spend a few moments 
introducing them.  I had the pleasure, last night and this morning, of 
going through everyones biography and résumé.  If I sat here and 
read them to you, we would probably spend at least the next two 
hours with listening to their achievements.  I will forbear and try to 
give a quick summary of each of the achievements of our four 
panelists. 
Our first speaker today will be Kenneth Shropshire.  Ken is a 
Professor and Department Chairman at the Wharton School at the 
University of Pennsylvania.  He is also a sports industry consultant, 
speaker, and author of several award-winning books, including 
Agents of Opportunity: Sports Agents and Corruption in Collegiate 
Sports; The Sports Franchise Game: Cities in Pursuit of Sports 
Franchises, Events, Stadiums, and Arenas; In Black and White: Race 
and Sports in America; Sports and the Law: A Modern Anthology; 
and, more recently, Basketball Jones: America Above the Rim. 
Ken also authors columns in various media publications, has been 
a commentator on TV and radio, and has his own web site.14  Ken 
was also Program Chairman for the American Bar Association 
Section on Sports Law.  Ken graduated from Stanford.  And, lest I 
                                                          
 13 Id. 
 14 See Kenneth Shropshire, at http://www.kennethshropshire.com (last visited Jan. 5, 
2002). 
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forget, he also has some local roots here; he did attend the law school 
that is just north of Fordham.   
We are very fortunate to have Ken here today.  He will present an 
overview for us on the topic of league structuring and its economic 
implications, focusing on why there is a movement towards 
restructuring or structuring of professional sports leagues and the 
implications for antitrust, intellectual property, and other concerns. 
Our second speaker is Tandy ODonoghue.  Tandy is an Associate 
with the firm of Proskauer Rose here in New York.  She works in the 
firms Litigation and Dispute Resolution Department.  She has 
worked for Proskauers clients in the sports industry, including 
Major League Soccer, which she will talk about at some length, the 
National Hockey League (hereinafter NHL), the National 
Basketball Association (hereinafter NBA), the Philadelphia Eagles, 
and the ATP Tour.  Tandy recently spent a number of months in 
Boston, where Proskauer Rose defended Major League Soccer in the 
antitrust case to which Jessica referred and I talked about a few 
moments ago. 
Tandy graduated from Cornell University and received her Juris 
Doctor in 1997, magna cum laude, from Tulane University School of 
Law, where she was a Senior Associate Editor of the Tulane Law 
Review. 
Tandy will address from the legal perspective why the single-
entity structure is attractive to new and emerging leagues.  She will 
focus on the recent Major League Soccer case in Boston, where 
Judge OToole granted summary judgment in favor of Major League 
Soccer on the single-entity section 1 Sherman Act issue.15 
Our third speaker will be Jeffrey Kessler.  Jeff is the go-to 
person for all league player issues.  If the players have a concern, 
they will go to Jeff Kessler.  Jeff is a Partner at the firm of Weil, 
Gotshal & Manges in New York.  For those of you who have read 
any player issues, the media inevitably seems to quote Jeff, who 
usually obliges.  He has been involved in virtually every major sports 
antitrust and labor law issue over the past decade.  In terms of his 
                                                          
 15 See Fraser, 97 F. Supp. 2d 130. 
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other achievements, he also concentrates in the area of antitrust law, 
and trade regulation; he has litigated complex sports antitrust cases 
and other antitrust cases during his illustrious career at Weil, 
Gotshal, which is continuingI do not mean to make this sound like 
it is the end of your career, Jeff. 
MR. KESSLER: I feel like the casket should be opened at this 
point. 
MR. EDEL: Some of the sports law cases that Jeff has worked on 
are the Freeman McNeil free agency trial,16 the Reggie White case,17 
the Junior Bridgeman case,18 and the Fraser case involving Major 
League Soccer in Boston.19 
Jeff is a member of the American Bar Association Antitrust 
Section; he is an Adjunct Professor of Law at Fordham University 
School of Law; and he is a Founding Member of the Board of 
Advisors of the Georgetown University Study of Private Antitrust 
Litigation.  He has written and lectured extensively on a wide variety 
of antitrust, sports, and related topics.  Jeff graduated from Columbia 
College and from Columbia Law School, where he was a Kent 
Scholar and Editor of the Columbia Law Review. 
Jeff will also address the issue of the single-entity structure as 
reflected principally in the Major League Soccer case.  Not 
surprisingly, he will come out with a different perspective from 
Tandys, and it should be very interesting to the point-counterpoint 
that we have and the sparks that may fly there. 
Our fourth speaker, and our clean-up hitter today, is Jamin 
Dershowitz.  Jamin is General Counsel of the Womens National 
Basketball Association (hereinafter WNBA) and Assistant General 
Counsel of the NBA.  As you may know or may not know, the 
WNBA is structured as a single-entity league. 
                                                          
 16 Powell v. Natl Football League, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1358-59 (D. Minn. 1991) 
(holding that the labor exemption had ended because the National Football League Players 
Association had decertified). 
 17 White v. Natl Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Minn. 1993). 
 18 Bridgeman v. Natl Basketball Assn (re: Chris Dudley), 838 F. Supp. 172 (D.N.J. 
1993). 
 19 See Fraser, 97 F. Supp. 2d 130. 
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Jamin graduated from the University of Pennsylvania and from 
Yale Law School.  He clerked for Judge Joseph Tauro, worked with 
the Legal Aid Society, and segued quite naturally from there into 
working for the NBA. 
Jamin will discuss today some of the practical issues involved in 
being a single-entity league.  As a practitioner, he will focus on the 
day-to-day issues and how they differ in a single-entity league from 
that which we see in a more traditional model, such as you might 
think about from the National Football League (hereinafter NFL), 
Major League Baseball (hereinafter MLB), the NBA, or the 
National Hockey League. 
I am now delighted to turn over, and stop speaking for a change, 
the program to Ken Shropshire.  
MR. SHROPSHIRE: Good Afternoon.  It is good to see some 
former students here today.  I will try not to cover old territory. 
I will do a quick overview of league structures, historically and 
currently.  Although I wont detail the inner workings of the single-
entity structure, I will try to introduce some of its attributes and 
flaws, so that the later speakers can elaborate.  What I will try to tie 
in are some of the business reasons why the single-entity structure is 
being looked to so much. 
Many of you know that originally sports in America, especially the 
team sports, started off as individual clubs.20  You have stories of 
George Halas sitting around with the rest of the football team, 
passing the hat around after games to collect funds to divide amongst 
the team.21  At the heart of that is the thought that we started off with 
individual and independent clubs that eventually got together and 
said, Hey, we should come together with a plan, a schedule, 
                                                          
 20 See, e.g., Gregor Lentze, The Legal Concept of Professional Sports Leagues: The 
Commissioner and an Alternate Approach from a Corporate Perspective, 6 MARQ. SPORTS 
L.J. 65, 66 (1995). 
 21 For a brief biography of Halas, see Real Men: George Halas, at 
http://www.manlyweb.com/realmen/GeorgeHalas.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2002).  While 
he may not have passed his trademark hat into the crowd to collect money, Halas was the 
founder, owner, and a player for the Chicago Bears, and was one of the leading forces 
behind the creation and development of the NFL. 
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organize, and become a league.  So it was the teams that formed the 
leagues.  Sometimes we lose track of that, but it was the leagues that 
were created to direct the success of the individual teams. 
Many legal scholars, and those of you taking sports law courses, 
have trouble or point out the trouble of trying to define what kind of 
legal structure a sports league is.22  Is it a corporation?  What is this 
thing?  How do you view this thing and how do you deal with it?  
That issue is certainly at the heart of the problems that are there in 
the cases that have tried to figure out if the single-entity defense is 
valid.23  What we began to see was the law of private associations 
being applied to determine how these leagues should operate, how 
they should run, and how the law should address them.24  If you go 
back and look at this stuff, you will see an old Harvard Law Review 
article, entitled Private Associations, that many people point to as 
the crux of how to define these leagues legally.25 
If you look for when these problems began and when this whole 
idea of restructuring came to bear on these leagues, it is relatively 
recent.  If you look at the initial sports law hornbooks, such as the 
Weistart and Lowell book,26 or Lionel Sobels book from the 
1970s,27 you see there a theoretical conversation about what happens 
when individual teams and the league start fighting.  There was very 
little guidance from the case law until we got beyond that period. 
The key distinction that you see in these discussions though, 
between private associations and sports leagues is the emergence of 
the  commissioner,  as  opposed  to  the  leadership  within  a  private  
                                                          
 22 For a sampling of the various views of a sports leagues legal status, see Thane N. 
Rosenbaum, The Antitrust Implications of Professional Sports Leagues Revisited: Emerging 
Trends in the Modern Era, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 729 (1987); Michael S. Jacobs, 
Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single-Entity Theory: A Defense of the 
Status Quo, 67 IND. L.J. 25 (1991). 
 23 For discussion, see generally Brad McChesney, Professional Sports Leagues and the 
Single Entity Defense, 6 SPORTS LAW. J. 125 (1999) (discussing various sports leagues have 
claimed to be single entities in order to defend against charges of antitrust liability). 
 24 See Lentze, supra note 20, at 76. 
 25 Note, Development in the LawJudicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 
76 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1963). 
 26 JOHN C. WEISTART & CYM H. LOWELL C., THE LAW OF SPORTS (1979). 
 27 LIONEL S. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE LAW (1977). 
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association, and the way that the courts began to treat the 
commissioner in these settings.28 
 There were a couple of sidebar events where property law came 
into play and where there was an argument that whenever the 
commissioner or league would take action, they were doing some 
harm or taking property from the team for a short period of time.29  
That kind of discussion was the precursor for some of the decisions 
that we see today, including the Raiders decisions.30 
It became clear that the heart of how a league operates and how the 
courts will view a league is based largely on the respective leagues 
constitution and bylaws.31  The courts said to the leagues, Look, the 
way we want to treat you is how you want to treat yourself. You set 
forth the rules and guidelines as with any other private association, 
and then we will know how to deal with you in the way that we 
should treat you. 
We began to see, in Finley v. Kuhn,32 that the court is trying to 
figure out what the commissioner did in negating the sale by Finley.  
The court said it was not whether Commissioner Kuhn was wise in 
voiding the trade, but whether he had the authority.  That became 
what the courts continually tried to look at to decide whether or not 
there was authority present.33 
Just prior to that case, if you think about the economics, the 
biggest economic influx in sports was television in the 1950s34 and 
                                                          
 28 See Lentze, supra note 20, at 69-79. 
 29 See Note, supra note 25, at 998. 
 30 L.A. Meml Coliseum Commn v. Natl Football League, 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 
1986); L.A. Meml Coliseum Commn v. Natl Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 
1984). 
 31 See Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 795 (stating that [t]he implications drawn from 
early case law suggest that so long as a league rule is incorporated into a collective 
bargaining agreement, after being subject to meaningful arms length negotiation between 
the relevant parties, the nonstatutory labor exemption should immunize a league from 
antitrust liability.). 
 32 Charles O. Finley & Co., Inc. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978). 
 33 See Natl Basketball Assn v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562, 568-69 (9th 
Cir. 1987). 
 34 See Brett T. Goodman, The Sports Broadcasting Act: As Anachronistic as the 
Dumont Network?, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 469, 471-72 (1995).  Though the first 
televised sporting event in America, a college baseball game, occurred in 1939, professional 
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with it came a need for a greater level of cooperation among the 
teams in order to be successful in the television market.35  This was 
what was contemplated at the time: Lets negotiate these TV 
contracts as a group rather than as individual franchises and we will 
be able to gain more from the networks.  This was certainly the 
basis of discussion in the United States v. National Football 
League36 case in the early 1950s, and certainly why we see the 
evolution of the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961.37 
These set the stage for courts trying to figure out, in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s what a league is, and, more importantly, the big 
battle of whether or not antitrust law should apply to sports 
leaguesspecifically whether or not this is the type of enterprise that 
is subject to scrutiny under section 138 and section 239. 
The biggest focus on this that we have seen in recent years which 
turned the corner in thinking about this, were the Raiders relocation 
cases, involving Al Davis and the Raiders, in the late 1970s and early 
1980s.40  This is where the single-entity defense41 becomes the shield 
that the leagues look to say to courts, Wait a minute, theyre one of 
us.  Were all the same.  How can you possibly say that we are 
violating the antitrust laws when we are just a single entity?  That 
cannot be and we should not allow that to happen.  Similar issues 
emerged in other cases at that time, in the relocations of the San 
Diego Clippers42 and others,43 and you saw a freezing of league 
                                                                                                                                      
sports did not gain major exposure from the networks until the 1950s. Id. 
 35 See Lentze, supra note 20, at 66. 
 36 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953). 
 37 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1961).  This act is an exemption from antitrust laws for agreements 
covering the telecasting of sports contests and the combining of professional football 
leagues. 
 38 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2001).  Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits agreements or 
conspiracies among competitors that have an anticompetitive effect on the market. 
 39 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2001).  Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits actions taken to gain or 
maintain a monopoly. 
 40 L.A. Meml Coliseum Commn v. Natl Football League, 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 
1986); L.A. Meml Coliseum Commn v. Natl Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 
1984). 
 41 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
 42 Natl Basketball Assn v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 43 The Baltimore Colts and the Arizona Cardinals were among the NFL teams           
that relocated in the aftermath of the Raiders decisions.  See Jack Clary,                            
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actions occur as the Raiders successfully got a judgment against the 
NFL in that case.44 
So as this begins to develop, I think it also becomes clear that the 
single-entity defense may be helpful in some labor settings as well.  
From the business standpoint against teams, and from the labor 
standpoint against players, it becomes in the leagues best interests to 
figure out a way to be viewed as a single entity. 
As many franchises were going through transformations, a 
statement that highlights some of the business issues of the time is 
OMalleys statement about why he decided to sell the Dodgers to 
Murdoch and Fox.45  Basically, he said that you need a broader 
financial base than an individual family to carry you through the 
storm, that youve got to find a way to make the smaller enterprises 
work within a group, and that sports are becoming entertainment, a 
different business from that of George Halass time. 
Certainly, we have seen different owners step up and act counter to 
broader league interests.  Apart from Al Davis, you saw Jerry Jones 
of the Dallas Cowboys take individual actions for the benefit of his 
team46 that were not necessarily in line with what David Harris 
described as league-think in his book The League.47  Basically, 
Joness actions were not in line with what was best overall for the 
league. 
Many people looking at this said, Well, lets look as if we are 
going to start a new league, which we have seen enough of in recent 
years, what is the best way to structure it?  How should we do it to 
avoid the problems that we have seen regarding labor, the problems 
                                                                                                                                      
The Third 25, THE COFFIN CORNER, Vol. XVI (1994), available at 
http://www.footballresearch.com/articles/frpage.cfm?topic=seas-25c (last visited Jan. 5, 
2002). 
 44 See L.A. Meml Coliseum Commn v. Natl Football League, 791 F.2d 1356, 1359 
(9th Cir. 1986). 
 45 See The Official Website of the Los Angeles Dodgers, History, Timeline, 1990s, at 
http://dodgers.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/la/history/la_history_timeline_article.jsp?article=11 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2002).  On March 19, 1998 the FOX Group officially took over the team 
from the OMalley family that had owned the team for over fifty years. 
 46 Natl Football League Properties, Inc. v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 922 F. 
Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 47 DAVID HARRIS, THE LEAGUE: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE NFL (1986). 
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we have seen regarding antitrust, and also to move forward more 
rapidly to take advantage of the entertainment-type synergy, and also 
make quicker decisions about those opportunities? 
The classic strategy analysis of a sports model for success would 
take you through a few different elements.  Let me highlight some 
and then close with a couple of thoughts. 
The first element, as Martin mentioned, is certainly the financing 
to get these enterprises funded.  Most problematic for the single-
entity structure is figuring out how to tell the large-ego set of owners 
that this league is going to be a little bit different and that as a single 
entity, one of the owners, like George Steinbrenner48 or Jerry Buss,49 
will not have the opportunity to be out front in the same manner that 
previous leagues have had individual owners out front. 
The next element is the control.  If you are the commissioner, the 
president or head of the league, you do not have to go to twenty-nine 
or thirty owners and say, What is it that we should do?  With the 
single-entity structure, decisions can be made in more of a 
centralized manner.50  At various times and in various leagues, it can 
be said that some commissioners have had more of that kind of 
power than others.51  And certainly, in Major League Baseball, the 
Bud Selig model is probably as far away as you can get from an 
individual who is in charge, and more often it is the owners who 
come together to make league decisions.52 
The third element relates to the product on the field that is 
produced by the traditional model versus this new single-entity 
                                                          
 48 George Steinbrenner is the majority owner of the New York Yankees              
baseball team, and one of the most influential and well-known team owners in              
Major League Baseball.  See The Official Website of the New York Yankees, at 
http://yankees.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/nyy/team/nyy_frontoffice_dir.jsp?club_context=nyy 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2002). 
 49 Dr. Jerry Buss is the owner of the Los Angeles Lakers basketball team, and like 
Steinbrenner in baseball, is a prominent team owner in the National Basketball Association.  
For a history of the Lakers franchise and a chronicle of their success, see Lakers History, at 
http://www.nba.com/lakers/history/history.html#18 (last visited Jan. 5, 2002). 
 50 See McChesney, supra note 23, at 142-43.  The author compares the solidarity of 
purpose and interest in MLS, with the intraleague squabbles that one sees in other leagues. 
 51 See Lentze, supra note 20, at 71. 
 52 See id. at 80-81. 
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concept.  How much control does the league have over the quality of 
the gameplay?  I mean, when you think about this like any other 
consumer product, do you have more control if what you put out 
there is the result of centralization?  Think of the XFL and the 
product that is there, whether you like the league or not, there is 
uniformity in the way the league and teams look.  This element also 
allows the league to take care of the large-market/small-market 
problems that we are seeing in baseball and basketball.53  If it is all 
centralized, it is easier to take care of than trying to put the pressure 
on the teams themselves. 
The next element concerns the marketing problems that may arise.  
The key marketing element in sports is consumer confidence that this 
is a valid and fair competition, and that there is no advantage to any 
individual franchise.54  Again, the single-entity model can be 
confusing, in that you do not have the traditional competitive 
elements of owner against owner.55  And if combined with that you 
lack a strong commissioner, if you dont have the white-swathed hair 
of Commissioner Landis56 to say everything is okay, then the 
problem gets even deeper. 
The final element concerns the legal issues and the benefits that 
come from the single-entity structure.  It is not clearly defined yet.  It 
is not clear that this entity escapes antitrust scrutiny.  As we 
mentioned, section 2 still lays out there, and section 1 possibly still 
exists.57  And remember, there is a difference between antitrust 
actions by players as opposed to those by other teams or even upstart 
leagues.58  If other leagues come into play, particularly with regard to 
section 2, how valid is the single-entity defense going to be in that 
type of setting? 
                                                          
 53 See, e.g., Dan Lewis, It Happens Every Spring, REASON ONLINE (2001), at 
http://www.reason.com/0105/co.dl.it.shtml (last visited Jan. 5, 2002). 
 54 See Lentze, supra note 20, at 70.  Public confidence in baseball dropped dramatically 
after the Black Sox Scandal, involving the fixing of the 1919 World Series, leading to the 
installation of the near-omnipotent Commissioner Landis. 
 55 See McChesney, supra note 23, at 142-44. 
 56 For a short biography of Landis, see Kenesaw Mountain Landis (1866-1944), at 
http://www.inficad.com/~ksup/landis.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2002). 
 57 See McChesney, supra note 23, at 141-45. 
 58 See id. at 127-33.  Suits brought by players under antitrust grounds may succeed 
whereas suits by other teams or other leagues may not pierce the single-entity defense. 
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Based on the full analysis of this single entity, if you think of the 
WNBA, MLS, and the XFL, people say that notwithstanding the 
financing problems, the lack of legal confidence, and certain 
marketing concerns, that this is a model to try.  That is why we have 
seen sports going forward in that direction. 
We have seen some restructuring, particularly with MLS.  Can 
we really get funds in by giving owners no kind of Steinbrenner-
esque face time?  But they have addressed this and been trying to 
make it work better. 
In the end, regarding restructuring, I dont think we are wherever 
we are going to be, and I do not think that we will see any 
unstructuring of any of the major sports, but we will see a different 
structure for the newer emerging sports, particularly as some of these 
upstart leagues go by the wayside and others come up in their place.  
Let me stop at that and let others talk about what is next. 
MS. ODONOGHUE: Let me ask everybody to step back for a 
second and, instead of focusing on the antitrust element of a leagues 
structure, think about some of the general difficulties that a new 
league or any new business will face.  There are always antitrust 
concerns, but separate and apart from that, I think that a fundamental 
issue that new leagues have to consider is the competitive 
environment they are coming into and how to ensure their success in 
that environment. 
Besides dealing with a competitive environment, MLS is coming 
into an environment where soccer has failed miserably in the past 
and the League wants to avoid its predecessors mistakes.59  There 
are also the issues of wanting to avoid the pitfalls that other leagues 
have faced in the legal arena, including the antitrust pitfalls.60 
But if we just look at a start-up business generally and look at a 
league generally and what it needs to do to maximize its revenue, the 
single-entity structure gives the league the ability to give those who 
                                                          
 59 See Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 97 F. Supp. 2d 130, 132 (D. Mass. 2000) 
(discussing the failure of other soccer leagues). 
 60 See generally Chi. Profl Sports Ltd. Pship v. Natl Basketball Assn, 95 F.3d 593 
(7th Cir. 1996); L.A. Coliseum Commn v. Natl Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 
1984); N. Am. Soccer League v. Natl Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982). 
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invest in this leaguethe actual investors in the league, its sponsors, 
its television partners, or its marketing partnersa degree of 
certainty that does not necessarily exist in other structures.61  This 
certainty has value in it.  So I think that new leagues are in a position 
where they need to capitalize on every piece of value out there, and 
the single-entity structure allows them to do that.62 
If we look at another league, such as the National Football League, 
the NFL has the ability to take the intellectual property associated 
with it and all of its clubs and package that for its sponsors and its 
television partners.  But it is able to do that in a different way than an 
entity like Major League Soccer.  It is able to do that because it 
secured the right to do that from the clubs.63 
In a single entity like MLS, the intellectual property rights, for 
example, reside with the entity, they reside with the league.64  The 
teams do not own anything. The teams are a part of the league.  So 
not only do you give yourself and your business partners the ability 
to  use such assets to their full advantage,  but  you  avoid  the pitfalls  
                                                          
 61 Karen Jordan, Forming A Single Entity: A Recipe For Success For New Professional 
Sports Leagues, 3 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 235, 245, 247 (2001) (having a centralized 
system of decision making in the league office shield the team owners from money 
pressures which can lead to rash decisions and potentially hurt their investment); Heike K. 
Sullivan, Fraser v. Major League Soccer: The MLSs Single-Entity Structure Is A Sham, 
73 TEMP. L. REV. 865, 866 (2000) (noting that the risk-friendly nature of the MLS system 
where the league has control appeals to investors because it gives them a greater chance of 
survival); see also Larry Lebowitz, Sports Inc.: Leagues are Forming as Single Entities 
Where Decision and Profits Are Shared By All Owners, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), 
Apr. 20, 1997, at 1F, available at 1997 WL 3098439 (discussing that owners see the 
advantage of investing in a single entity as decreasing the risks of independent team 
ownership where one owner could spend out of control and put the other team out of 
business). 
 62 All revenues generated by league operations belong directly to MLS.  See Fraser, 97 
F. Supp. 2d at 131.  MLS owns and controls all trademarks, copyrights, and other 
intellectual property rights that relate in any way either to the League or to any of its teams.  
Id.  MLS also owns all tickets to MLS games and receives the revenues from ticket sales.  
Id.  There are central league regulations regarding ticket policies, including limits on the 
number of complimentary tickets any team may give away.  Id. 
 63 See generally Gary R. Roberts, The Legality of The Exclusive Collective Sale of 
Intellectual Property Rights by Sports Leagues, 3 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 52 (2001). 
 64 See Fraser, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 133. 
PANEL3.FINAL 2/15/02  2:54 PM 
428 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 12 
 
that can be associated with a maverick owner doing what he sees fit 
for his particular club.65 
Now, of course, there are antitrust issues there, but what you are 
really trying to do is, avoid having an owner make deals on his own 
that are not beneficial for the entire league and its survival.66  That is 
not just an antitrust problem.  That is a problem with being able to 
deliver your product to the sponsors with whom you want to be 
associated.  The single entity model minimizes these risks, making it 
a very attractive model in this competitive environment. 
I think some of the new media aspects really tie into that as well.  
The Internet is a whole new marketing device that we have really 
seen grow in conjunction with some of the new leagues.67  It is a 
place where you have another audience, and where you really need to 
guarantee to your partners that you are going to be delivering what 
you have said you will deliver, without having affiliated entities 
doing their own thing to the detriment of your partnerships.  Major 
League Soccer is an example of a league where there is that kind of 
certainty and related asset value. 
Apart from that, there are unquestionably antitrust issues.  I am 
confident that Jeff Kessler will talk about those.68 
But just from the management perspective, I think the bottom line 
is that there is always an antitrust question, even though Brown v. 
Pro Football69 did a little bit to clarify where the labor laws stop and 
the antitrust laws begin.70  As long as uncertainty exists, it behooves 
a league, particularly a new league that is going to face start-up 
                                                          
 65 See Matthew Futterman, Owners Can be their Own Worst Enemy, NEWHOUSE NEWS 
SERVICE, Aug. 30, 2000 (discussing the owner of the Dallas Cowboys, Jerry Jones, making 
deals with sponsors that are competitors of the NFLs sponsors). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Terry Lefton, NFL Signs Its Own Big 3, THESTANDARD.COM, July 11, 2001, available 
at 2001 WL 6874179 (CBS Sportsline and the NFL entered a five-year deal for the NFLs 
Internet rights that is the richest web sports rights alliance ever). 
 68 See infra text accompanying notes 86-109. 
 69 518 U.S. 231 (1996). 
 70 In Brown v. Pro Football, 518 U.S. 231 (1996), the Supreme Court held that when 
the NFL bargained to impasse with the NFLPA over a mandatory subject of collective 
bargaining and then unilaterally implemented the terms of its last good-faith bargaining 
offer, it was exempt from antitrust scrutiny.  Id. 
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problems like limited funds, et cetera, to do what it can do to shore 
up its labor situation.  If shoring up its labor situation means taking 
steps to prevent itself from being subject to the antitrust sword that 
players might use to determine their terms and conditions of 
employment, if they opt not to use the labor laws, then that is 
something it really needs to take into account in structuring itself.  I 
do not think that this is something that investors would not consider.  
This is important to them. 
Looking back on the history of sports, other leagues have gone 
through enormous antitrust litigation.71  Although I think we have 
seen that just because you are a single entity, that does not mean you 
are not going to go through some very serious antitrust litigation, but 
it is an extra measure of taking care of those risks.72 
I think the financing point is a very interesting one.  How do you 
as a single entity make yourself attractive enough in a risky area to 
secure financing?  When you are making an effort to appeal to 
people with a lot of money, and the potentially big egos that go along 
with that, but you are not willing to offer them that sort of 
individual owner role in things, you are going to have some 
difficulty.73  Part of the way you deal with that is making it clear that 
in this new risky venture when you are a single entity you can spread 
the financial risk around; you spread the risk; you spread the reward. 
Some owners are in a position where theyve got a big 
marketplace, with a big-market club, making big-market dollars.  
Perhaps their counterparts are not so fortunate.  This disparity is part 
of the way the market had developed in soccer in the past, and was 
something MLS needed to avoid.74 
                                                          
 71 See generally Chi. Profl Sports Ltd. Pship v. Natl Basketball Assn, 95 F.3d 593 
(7th Cir. 1996); L.A. Coliseum Commn v. Natl Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 
1984); N. Am. Soccer League v. Natl Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 72 MLS is a single entity and has still undergone serious antitrust litigation.  See Fraser, 
97 F. Supp. 2d at 132.   
 73 MLS teams have had some problems keeping investors.  The league took over the 
D.C. United, the most successful franchise in MLS, due to an inability to find new investors 
during the two years it was for sale.  Major League Soccer Takes Over Troubled D.C. 
United, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 15, 2000, Sports, at 11. 
 74 See Richard Alm, One More Time, With Feeling; Lowered Expectations, High Hopes 
for MLS, THE RECORD, Apr. 7, 1996, at S15 (discussing the failure of the North American 
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If you structure yourself as a single entity, you can offer your 
investors the avoidance of that situation.  You could say, Listen, we 
are going to share profits and losses equally on a pro rata basis in 
accordance with your investment in this league, and that is one of the 
ways you can avoid becoming one of those clubs that isnt making 
any money simply because of where you are, because you do not 
have a good local TV deal, whatever the case may be. 
That is certainly not the kind of thing that would happen in Major 
League Soccer.  Obviously, given what we know has happened in 
Major League Soccer, that does not guarantee you will be an 
automatic financial success,75 but it means that the risks are spread 
and, hopefully, in time, the rewards will be spread as well.  So there 
is a little bit more certainty there, and I think that, again, certainty is 
something that can win out over the gratification an individual may 
derive from actually owning a team. 
Some people have said that to satisfy the ego or ownership 
element in MLS the investors can purchase the right to manage a 
team in addition to their investment in the league.  But again, it is a 
very different situation than if they actually owned the club, which 
they do not.  Perhaps the right to manage a team satisfies egos, and 
perhaps it is just something that people are interested in doing, but it 
is another way to secure additional financing because, at least in 
Major League Soccer, there is an additional cost associated with 
acquiring that right.76 
The control aspect is very important for some of the reasons I 
talked about a moment ago.  Control refers to controlling your 
sponsorship, your licensing, your marketing, and making sure that 
your investors do not have the ability to go out and do otherwise, 
which in a single entity such as MLS, they will not have the ability to 
do.  If they attempt to do that, part of what a league can do in its 
documents is to carve out a very clear with or without cause 
termination right. There are many creative ways of doing things 
                                                                                                                                      
Soccer League due to financial disparities in the different markets). 
 75 Major League Soccer has lost in excess of $250 million since the leagues inception 
in 1996.  MLS Takes Control of D.C. United, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 15, 2000. 
 76 See Fraser, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 132. 
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within this structure that give you the rights you might not have, or 
need in a traditional league structure. 
 The quality-control issue is also an interesting one.  MLS has been, 
at times in the press, attacked in terms of going out of its way to 
achieve competitive balance within its clubs and not succeeding.77  
Nobody is perfect.  I think sometimes it works and sometimes it does 
not, but the bottom line is, there is a mechanism there that does not 
allow the clubs with the most money to change competitive balance 
in a way that would undermine a start-up business. 
That can be another attractive feature of securing investors.  If they 
come in and they say to themselves, Well, let me step back, because 
what if another investor is willing to dig down as deep into his 
pockets as he can go to win, but Im not willing or able to dig as 
deep, wont I lose out?  In MLS, the answer is no, it just will not 
happen that way. 
That does not mean that people do not have input into who they 
may like on their team, but it does mean that there are budgetary 
controls and budgetary restrictions at the league level that prevent 
everything from spiraling out of control and prevent the types of 
market disparity that can bring a great deal of unhealthiness to the 
league, particularly a new league, as a whole. 
Television agreements are another important area here, just in 
terms of being able to get your product out into the marketplace.  
New leagues are in a particularly volatile position in terms of being 
able to get themselves on television, but the more you have to offer 
the networks, the better off you will be.78  I think that has certainly 
been the case with MLS, and I imagine that has been the case with 
the other start-up leagues as well.  Again, it is that measure of control 
that you get with a single entity that you do not necessarily have with 
some of the other structures. 
                                                          
 77 MLS has been attacked by the players in the MLS litigation that the lack of 
competition among teams for players has in effect eliminated the market for their talent.  See 
Jordan, supra note 61, at 242. 
 78 See Roberts, supra note 63. 
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Single entities are probably in a really good position to capitalize 
on streams of revenue that would otherwise be divvied up and be less 
than what the league itself can get with respect to new arenas and 
new playing facilities.  I think that is probably an area that has yet to 
be developed, but it is an important part of any single entity.  I think 
the longer these newer leagues are around, the more we will see that. 
Just to close out on the antitrust issues, I think that we still have 
this ongoing issue with whether MLS is a single entity,79 although 
we do have a decision from the District of Massachusetts that says 
that it is indeed a single entity.80  Part of the reason why is that Major 
League Soccer is structured as a limited liability company 
(hereinafter LLC) which, for all intents and purposes, acts as a 
corporation.81 
Within the LLC context, you bring in your investors, you have a 
management committee (which is how LLCs like MLS are run under 
the Delaware law) and there is really no reason to treat it differently 
from a corporation,82 which as a single corporation will not be 
subject to section 1 scrutiny because it is a single actor, and you need 
more than one actor under section 1.83 
I think section 1 is something where you can structure yourself to 
help  you  to  avoid  some  of  the  litigation  problems  of  section  1.   
                                                          
 79 Fraser was scheduled to be heard before a three-judge panel in the First Circuit Court 
of Appeals on October 1, 2001.  Joe Rutland, Sports Notebook, HOUSTON CHRON., Sports, 
Aug. 28, 2001, available at 2001 WL 23624602. 
 80 See Fraser, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 131. 
 81 Id. (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 et. seq. (1996)). 
 82 An LLC is a form of statutory business organization that combines some of the 
advantages of a partnership with some of the advantages of a corporation.  See Fraser, 97 F. 
Supp. 2d at 134. 
 83 Section 1 of the Sherman Act only prohibits collective activity by plural economic 
actors which unreasonably restrains competition.  See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence 
Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769-73 (1984) (holding that a parent company and its wholly 
owned subsidiary have a complete unity of interest and therefore cannot violate section 1 
of the Sherman Act); see also Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 
(1984) (holding that if the league is organized and functions as a single entity it cannot be 
found to be subject to section 1 of the Sherman Act; only section 2 claims apply to the 
activities of a single entity). 
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Section 2 is not such an easy thing to avoid, and section 2 is certainly 
out there.84 
 But I think that as far as restructuring leagues, which is what 
initially the panel was talking about here, that is a very different 
issue, and it is not clear yet how, if at all, the impact of the Fraser85 
case or the structure of any of the new leagues will impact the 
existing leagues.  I think it is a very detailed analysis that certainly 
we cannot really address on this panel, but it raises some very 
interesting questions. 
MR. KESSLER: Thank you. 
The single-entity issue is a wonderful example of how the legal 
system and lawyers can mess up a business structure in this country.  
It is also a good example of why panels like this can be very 
dangerous, because they tend to raise concerns for businessmen that 
do not make any sense, except for the desire to achieve a particular 
legal result in a courtroom, as opposed to achieving a particular 
result in the marketplace. 
Basically, as we have seen so far, the single entity has been a 
failure from a business sense.  MLS, for example, which is the 
leading example of a purported single-entity structure, claims in 
court that it lost $250 million during its first five years of existence
that is terrible.86  Its revenues last year were less than its first-year 
revenuesthat is abysmal. 
Why has this happened?  It has happened because fans do not like 
the claimed single-entity structure.  Entrepreneurs must be given the 
power to hire the players for their individual teams.  The absence of 
control over players and rosters is something that is a detriment, not 
a positive, because you create an image that there is one giant fantasy 
soccer game that someone plays in the league office in which players 
get ripped from their fans by a central authority and reallocated 
                                                          
 84 Section 2 of the Sherman Act states in relevant part: Every person who shall 
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or 
persons, to monopolize . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2001). 
 85 See Fraser, 97 F. Supp. 2d 130. 
 86 See Fraser v. Major League Soccer L.L.C., Trial Transcript of 10/11/2000 at 2014:2-
5; see also supra note 75. 
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around the country.  MLS is having trouble finding new investors 
because few entrepreneurs want to own such a thing.87 
So what has the single-entity structure accomplished for MLS?  
Well, so far, pending appeal, it has enabled the MLS operator-
investors to get away with having no competition for players, which 
is a wonderful, anticompetitive objective to achieve if you are an 
owner, but not if it also prevents you from growing your revenues.  I 
will talk about the appeal issues in the Fraser case in a few minutes. 
The bottom line is that there is a good reason why, up until now, 
all of the successful sports leagues in this countryand around the 
world, by the way (this is an international result)have adopted a 
model of individual ownership of teams.  The reason is that the 
professional team sports business is basically a local business.  You 
get a local personality who runs it.  You want an entrepreneur who 
will develop it.  You want to create an association between the team 
and the local fans and have the sense that the teams are, in fact, 
competing, because you are selling, in sports, the product of 
competition, in which each team has a separate interest from the 
other teams.88  That is what works.  It is what has worked from the 
very beginning of baseball, basketball, football, hockey, rugby and 
soccer around the world, and in almost any sport that you can     
think of. 
Generally, economists will tell you that businesses adopt structures 
because they are efficient and they are effective.  If the so-called 
single-entity structure had independent economic value, it would 
have been adopted thirty years ago.  It would not have taken until 
                                                          
 87 Eric Fisher, Anschutz Takes Over United; Billionaire Operates Three Other MLS 
Teams, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2001, at B1 (noting that control over the D.C. United team 
gives one owner control of one-third of the teams in MLS); MLS Eliminates Fusion, Mutiny 
(Jan. 8, 2002) (containing the league announcement that both Florida teams are to cease 
operations, leaving MLS with only three remaining investor-operatorsPhilip Anschutz 
with five teams, Lamar Hunt with two teams, and Robert Kraft with one team), at 
http://www.mlsnet.com/content/02/msl0108miatb.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2002). 
 88 Debbie Thorn et al., The Impact of Sports Marketing Relationships and Antitrust 
Issues in United States, J. PUB. POLY & MKT., Apr. 1, 2001, at 73, available at 2001 WL 
25436089 (arguing that the product associated with professional sports is the entertainment 
of competition and that the business of sports involves competition with the players 
competing for space on teams, teams competing for players, and leagues competing for team 
locations). 
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now for lawyers to think of it for purely legal reasons.  So the idea of 
trying to create a single entity to escape antitrust liability, as far as I 
am concerned, has been terrible not just for the players involved, but 
for the business of professional team sports. 
The Continental Basketball Association recently collapsed as a 
minor league, and arguably that was in part because Isiah Thomas 
convinced them to change their structure to form a single entity.89  It 
existed for many years, when there were individual entrepreneurs 
operating the individual teams.  In one year, they put together a 
single-entity structure, and the whole thing collapsed.90  This does 
not seem like a coincidence. 
Most of the start-up leagues that have tried a single-entity structure 
have failed.  Well talk about the WNBA separately because I think 
that is a different case, at least economically, because it is really a 
structure where the teams in one league, the NBA, own another 
league and the NBA itself is clearly not a single entity.  But the 
overall point is that the single-entity league, as a business model, has 
so far proven to be an economic failure. 
So why did the MLS owners choose to form a single entity?  They 
did it so that they could claim an exemption from section 1 of the 
Sherman Act and not have to compete with each other for their 
players.  There is no other reason.  In a series of antitrust cases in the 
1970s, 1980s and through the early 1990s, essentially the rule was 
that if you were not labor-exempt by having a union in place and 
fighting over the meaning of the labor exemption, the restrictions 
imposed by owners to restrain competition for players were held to 
be illegal.91  There was a consistent losing record by the owners on 
                                                          
 89 See Lester Munson & L. Jon Wertheim, Demise of the CBA: Music to their Ears; 
After Selling the Owners on his Plan to Turn the League Around, Isiah Thomas Quickly Led 
the CBA into Bankruptcy, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 9, 2001, available at 2001 WL 
8024730. 
 90 See id. 
 91 See, e.g., Mackey v. Natl Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding 
that the Rozelle Rule was an unreasonable restraint of trade because the Rozelle Rule was 
significantly more restrictive than necessary to serve legitimate business purposes); Smith v. 
Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that the NFL draft was an 
unreasonable restraint of trade); McNeil v. Natl Football League, 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
¶ 69,982, 68,769 (D. Minn. 1992), available at 1992 WL 315292 (holding that the NFLs 
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this point.92  Absent the labor exemption, whenever you got to the 
merits of the case, virtually all player restraints were found to be 
unreasonable restraints of trade.93 
So the sports team owners went to their lawyers and said, Cant 
you do anything about this?  Well, one of the things they tried to do 
was to assert the single-entity defense for the old established leagues, 
and that argument lost repeatedly.94  Even the Seventh Circuit in the 
Chicago Bulls case, which indicated that maybe, in some cases, a 
single-entity defense could apply, also said but not for players, not 
when you are restraining competition between the teams for their 
employees.95 
So the single-entity defense had little value for the old, established 
leagues, and the existing leagues are not likely to ever restructure 
themselves to become a single entity.  Every one of the older teams 
has a totally different market value and it is unlikely that they could 
ever put Humpty Dumpty together again in a new single-entity 
structure.  So the single-entity issue is really an issue for new, 
fledgling leagues. 
Here is where the lawyers come in.  They tell the entrepreneurs 
who are going to form a new league that, if they put all of their teams 
                                                                                                                                      
Plan B was an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of antitrust law); Jackson v. Natl 
Football League, 802 F. Supp. 226, 228-29 (D. Minn. 1992); Boris v. United States Football 
League, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 66,012 (C.D. Cal. 1984), available at 1984 WL 894; 
Linseman v. World Hockey Assn, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977); Robertson v. Natl 
Basketball Assn, 389 F. Supp. 867, 890-91, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Bowman v. Natl 
Football League, 402 F. Supp. 754, 756 (D. Minn. 1975); Kapp v. Natl Football League, 
390 F. Supp. 73, 82 (N.D. Cal. 1974), affd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978); Denver Rockets 
v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1058 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id.  See also Neal R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, Fraser v. Major League Soccer
Sports Leagues as Single Entities?, N.Y.L.J., May 16, 2000, at 3 (stating that judges have 
repeatedly failed to look past the individual ownership of teams when deciding whether 
traditional sports leagues can assert the single-entity defense, citing Sullivan v. Natl 
Football League, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994); L.A. Meml Coliseum Commn v. Natl 
Football League, 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986); N. Am. Soccer League v. Natl Football 
League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982); McNeil v. Natl Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871 
(D. Minn. 1992)). 
 95 See Chi. Profl Sports Ltd. Pship v. Natl Basketball Assn, 95 F.3d 593, 599-600 
(7th Cir. 1996). 
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into one holding company to own the whole thing, they then can 
claim that they are a single entity, which does not have to compete 
with each other for players, at least under section 1 of the Sherman 
Act.96 
So what happens?  Major League Soccer is a good example.  No 
sports entrepreneur really wants to invest in such a league, so an 
internal struggle develops among the Major League Soccer 
entrepreneurs.  Do we really have to give up all this control?  Cant 
we operate our teams separately?  Cant we have separate franchise 
values?  Do we really have to share all of our profits?  And a 
compromise is reached that keeps shifting, and that is what the 
record facts in the Fraser case show.97  The MLS owners never 
formed a true single entity, because they did not want to give up 
individual team control.  MLS is not a passive corporation in which 
people own stock and sit home and watch to see if their stock goes 
up or down and then sell it.  MLS is a company, an LLC, in which 
each of the investor-operators buy the rights, in a special class of 
stock, to run their individual teams, and they can resell those rights, 
and keep somewhere between fifty and fifty-five percent of their 
locally-generated revenues.98  (Just like, by the way, the type of 
revenue sharing that exists in the NFL, the NBA, and Major League 
Baseball.)  The percentages vary, but the concept is the same 
economic structure.  You can resell your ownership interest to run a 
sports team, and you can therefore develop a separate market value 
for your franchise.99  You do not share your profits and losses.100  So 
                                                          
 96 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §1 (2001) (Every contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal); see also 
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
 97 See Fraser, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 132-33 (describing the management of Major League 
Soccer). 
 98 See id.  See, e.g., MLS Eliminates Fusion, Mutiny, supra note 87 ([T]he League has 
made significant changes to its operating relationship with its teams. These adjustments will 
provide enhanced revenue opportunities at the local level by allowing teams to retain a 
greater share of revenue from ticket sales, local sponsorship and television.). 
 99 Fraser, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 133, 136 (operator-investors can harvest the value of the 
particular teams they operate by selling their operational rights or by requiring the league to 
pay them the fair market value of their investment). 
 100 Id. Admittedly, unlike differentiated shares of stock, the market value of a team 
operators investment will not simply reflect an aliquot share of the whole enterprise, but 
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the MLS investor-operator in New York would have an entirely 
different set of profits and losses than the MLS investor-operator in 
Chicago, based upon how he operates his team and manages his 
revenues and expenses.101 
Who hires coaches in MLS?  The individual MLS operator-
investors hire them.102  The League does not.  All of the MLS team 
employees are separately hired by and paid for by the individual 
operator-investors, except for the players.103  This is no coincidence.  
The players are the ones who are centrally hired by the League in 
order to prevent any competition from taking place.104 
So, in the end, I do not think MLS is a true single-entity structure 
and I dont think it is exempt from section 1 of the Sherman Act.  
Tandy ODonoghue does.105  In the end, the First Circuit will sort all 
of this out. 
But whether or not MLS is a true single entity, the point is that the 
MLS structure has clearly not been a good thing for the business of 
MLS.  The concept of a single entity has become the exclusive focus 
of the operator-investors in Major League Soccer.  It blinds them to 
the fact that operating a league in which the individual teams do not 
hire players is an unattractive business for the fans.  The MLS 
owners sit there and say, We are going to fight to preserve our 
structure.  Why?  So that they can lose another $250 million?  
Would you invest in such a single entity?  It does not make any 
sense, but that is where we are. 
On the section 2 issue, we also did not get to present a section 2 
claim against the MLS single-entity structure because the judge 
ended up ruling that the MLS single entity not only was immune 
                                                                                                                                      
will also reflect in certain respects the success of the local operation.  Id. 
 101 Id. at 133 (noting that, for example, in 1997 individual team operators received 100% 
of the first $1.24 million and 30% of the excess over $1.24 million of local broadcasts and 
sponsorship revenues (with annual increases), and 50-55% of ticket revenues from home 
games and stadium revenues). 
 102 Id. (It is undisputed that team operators are responsible for . . . general team 
administration, including salaries of the teams management and coaching staff.). 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 137-38. 
 105 See supra text accompanying notes 59-85. 
PANEL3.FINAL 2/15/02  2:54 PM 
2002] RESTRUCTURING PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES 439 
 
from section 1 review, but that it was immune from the section 2 
case as well.  The section 2 trial thus ended up being about an 
entirely different issue, the conspiracy between MLS and the USSF 
to exclude a rival soccer league.  In this case, the jury came back and 
found that there was no relevant market proven.106  So the MLS jury 
trial tells us nothing about a possible section 2 claim against a single-
entity structure.  Maybe we will find out more about this on appeal. 
As for the WNBA, I will say a couple of words about that.  
Obviously, the NBA is not a single entity. 
MR. DERSHOWITZ: That is not so obvious. 
MR. KESSLER: Well, okay.  It appears to me that the courts will 
not find the NBA to be a single entity, at least with respect to its 
players.  We have several decisions that would establish that point at 
least.107 
The NBA is a traditional non-single-entity structure.  It went into 
the WNBA as a second business.  The NBA teams, in effect, own the 
WNBA, and they claim single entity in that sense.108  However, the 
individual NBA teams, as I understand it, also have the right to 
operate specific WNBA franchises and keep much of the profits from 
such operations.  We will see how it works from an economic 
standpoint.  The New York Knicks, to give an example, are owned 
ultimately by Cablevision in a structure, which everyone, I believe, 
recognizes is a separate entity from the other owners in the NBA. 
The Knicks operate the WNBAs New York Liberty, generating 
different profits and losses than the other NBA owners make on their 
WNBA teams.  Perhaps this hybrid model will have a better chance 
of succeeding with fans in the marketplace than the MLS model, 
                                                          
 106 Fraser v. Major League Soccer, Trial Transcript of 12/11/2000, at 6805:2-22. 
 107 See Robertson v. Natl Basketball Assn, 389 F. Supp. 867, 890-91, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 
1975); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1058 (C.D. Cal. 1971); 
see also Robert E. Freitas, Overview: Looking Ahead at Sports and the Antitrust Law, 
Special Sports Issue:  Antitrust and the Business Side of Sports, 14-SPG ANTITRUST 15, 16 
(2000) (noting that the NBA is not a single entity with respect to market for players 
services). 
 108 Sarah Talalay, WNBA Is Achieving Steady, Cautious Growth, RECORD (Northern N.J), 
June 18, 2000, at S04, available at 2000 WL 15819232 (stating that the WNBA was created 
as a single entity and that all twenty-nine teams in the NBA own equal shares of the 
WNBA). 
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because WNBA fans seem to believe that the WNBA teams have 
more control over how their players are signed and allocated. 
In terms of a single-entity defense, my own view isand we will 
see what happens in the First Circuitthat the WNBA owners will 
not be able to hide under this defense.  The reason is that the WNBA 
teams appear to be controlled by a group of separate entities that do 
not share profits and losses in an economic sense. 
Now, if we lose in the First Circuit, and it eventually becomes the 
law that merely forming an LLC structure governs over economic 
reality, then we might face a different story.  But for now, we have a 
district court decision in Fraser that I think is wrong, and we will 
find out what happens on appeal.  The First Circuit will obviously 
have something to say about the future of the single-entity defense, 
and it may get played out in other Circuits as well. 
In the labor exemption area, there were competing rules in the 
different circuits for years before the Supreme Court finally took the 
issue in Brown v. Pro Football and resolved the issue in the courts.109  
Eventually, that might happen with the single-entity issue as well. 
MR. EDEL: Jeff, thank you. 
I think he has thrown down the gauntlet for you, Jamin. 
MR. DERSHOWITZ: I guess he has.  I was asked to fill in at the 
last minute for the XFL General Counsel, so I want to apologize in 
advance for those of you who were expecting a smash-mouth, in-
your-face, sexually charged legal debate.  About the only thing the 
WNBA has in common with the XFL is the amount of time our 
cameras stay focused on women during game broadcasts. 
I was asked to discuss the day-to-day business differences between 
working for a single-entity structured league like the WNBA and a 
more traditional league.  So I walked down the hall before I came 
here today and compared notes with the NBA General Counsel. 
                                                          
 109 Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (holding that a non-statutory 
antitrust exemption applies where there is a collective-bargaining relationship between a 
union and employer). 
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With respect to collective bargaining, no one on this panel would 
argue with the fact that the NBA is a single entityit speaks with 
one voice to the Players Association.110  The same is true of the 
WNBA.111 
The NBA General Counsel spends a lot of time negotiating and 
drafting media contracts for TV, radio, and the Internetleading few 
to argue that the NBA is not a single entity with respect to 
negotiating media contracts.112 
The same applies with respect to sponsorship and licensing 
agreements.  The NBA acts with one voice as a single entity when it 
licenses T-shirts and sells national sponsorships and video games and 
the like.113  Again, the same is true of the WNBA.114 
The other thing that both the NBA and WNBA spend a lot of time 
doing is enforcing trademark and other intellectual property rights.  
Again, very few people on this panel would argue that the NBA is 
not a single entity when it comes to dealing with its trademark and 
intellectual property rights.115 
Baseball may be the least centralized of all the major sports, but 
even baseball is trending in the direction of becoming more 
centralized.  It has just recently centralized its Internet businesses, 
and it is obviously a single entity with respect to its TV negotiations, 
collective bargaining and licensing. 
It is really a historical accident that many of these traditional so-
called sports leagues are not considered single entities.  When the 
                                                          
 110 See Natl Basketball Assn v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that for 
the purpose of negotiating with the Players Association, the NBA teams have bargained as 
a multi-employer bargaining unit). 
 111 See Stephen Nidetz, Hunter Gives Stern Silent Treatment, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 14, 1998. 
 112 See Chi. Profl Sports Ltd. Pship v. Natl Basketball Assn, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 
1996) (concluding that when acting in the broadcasting market the NBA is more like a 
single firm than multiple firms). 
 113 See Brandon L. Grusd, The Antitrust Implications of Professional Sports League-
Wide Licensing and Merchandising Arrangements, 1 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 1, 11-12 (1999). 
 114 See Alisa Solomon, Clutch Purse; Womens Stake in the Sports-Industrial Complex, 
VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 28, 1998. 
 115 See Louis Klein, National Basketball Association v. Motorola, Inc.: Future Prospects 
for Protecting Real-Time Information, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 585, 597 (1998). 
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NBA was formed fifty-some years ago,116 when eight guys got in a 
room and decided to start a league, they very easily could have 
started a corporation or an LLC, if that format was around back then.  
Instead, they started a joint venture.  I do not think, as Jeff might say, 
that it was because they needed to show the fans that they were 
competing.  I think that it was just a business decision they made at 
the time and it bears very little reference to the way the league 
operates today. 
I took the liberty of thumbing through the NBA Operations 
Manual before I came over here this morning.  It is full of rules and 
regulations telling the teams how they must operate if they want to 
be a part of the NBA familya member of the League. 
It has a lot of rules and regulations that you might expect to see.  
For instance, how far out is the three-point line, how big is the 
basketball, how long is each quarter.117  But it also has a lot of rules 
you may not expect to see.  I think it has about ten pages on what 
team mascots can and cannot do on the court.118  They are allowed to 
mock referees, but only during time-outs and only if they get the 
referees permission.119  They are not allowed to rappel from the 
ceiling.120  They are not allowed to hang on the rim.121  They are not 
allowed to stand on the scorers table.122 
Decibel levels, noise levels, and what kind of music can be played 
during the game and time-outs, is all outlined in the Manual.123 
Championship ring guidelines are also detailed.  There has to be a 
certain number of diamonds in the championship ring when the team  
                                                          
 116 See Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 771 n.180; see also Christian M. Mc Burney, Note, 
The Legality of Sports Leagues Restrictive Admissions Practices, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925, 
942 n.104 (1985) (establishing that the NBA emerged in 1949). 
 117 The NBA Operations Manual is an internal league document, and is not available for 
citation. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Supra note 117. 
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wins the championship and a certain level of clarity in the 
diamonds.124 
There are even regulations about the number of toilets that a new 
arena has to include if an NBA team is going to play in it.125  So 
every level of detail is contained within this Operations Manual.  It 
really exhibits just how centralized all of these businesses have 
becomeespecially the NBA, the league that I used to work for full-
time and still occasionally moonlight for. 
It is too easy to say that a traditional sports league is not a single 
entity.  The court cases are certainly starting to trend in the other 
direction.  Jeff mentioned the Chicago Bulls case.126  That case 
certainly went pretty far in saying that the NBA was a single entity 
with respect to a lot of its businesses.127  It has taken a long time for 
the courts to recognize the economic realities of how all of these 
businesses really operatebut the pendulum has clearly swung. 
There is one major difference between what I do and what the 
NBA General Counsel does.  The time that he spends administering 
the NBA salary cap is the time that I spend negotiating and signing 
player contracts directly with the League.  
Jeff also used the example of the Continental Basketball 
Association (hereinafter CBA).  It is a good example of how the 
single-entity structure is not a magic bullet.  MLS is losing money.128  
The WNBA is losing money.129  The ABL was a womens 
professional sports league that organized as a single entity, but it had 
a bad business plan and it went out of business after a couple of 
                                                          
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Chi. Profl Sports Ltd. Pship v. Natl Basketball Assn, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir 1996). 
 127 Id. at 600 (concluding that the NBA is closer to a single firm than a group of 
independent firms when acting in the broadcasting market). 
 128 Steve Davis, Playing On:  Concerns Remain, But Survival No Longer Main Issue, 
DALLAS MORN. NEWS, Apr. 5, 2001, at 4B, available at 2001 WL 18812247 (explaining 
that Major League Soccer lost approximately $250 million over its first five years in 
business). 
 129 Shannon Rose, Growing Pains Survival of WNBA Depending on TV 1st, Bigger Fan 
Base 2nd, ORLANDO SENT., July 15, 2001, at C1, available at 2001 WL 9197186 (reporting 
that the WNBA is still losing money.). 
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years.130  It paid players too much, and it played during the wrong 
season.131  The magic bullet that the ABL may have thought the 
single-entity structure provided did not work.  Maybe when Isiah 
Thomas formed the single-entity structure of the CBA, he also 
mistakenly thought it was a magic bullet.132  So I agree with Jeff that 
the single-entity structure is not a magic bullet in any way, shape, or 
form. 
There are other issuesnegativesregarding the single entity 
structure that are rarely spoken about.  One is more personal and one 
is more global. 
I will start on a personal note.  This is the time of year when the 
WNBA negotiates and signs player contracts.  In the next two 
months, I will be negotiating about a hundred veteran contracts and 
about another hundred rookie contracts.  It is not my favorite time of 
year.  It is certainly not my familys favorite time of year.  If I am a 
little grumpy today, it is because I have already had several salary 
conversations this morning with players and their agents. 
The discussions are really quite sobering.  These are elite players 
that have worked very hard to get to the top of their profession.  And 
I have to explain to them that they are not going to get A-Rod 
money, they are not going to get Shaq money, in fact, they are not 
even going to get first-year lawyer money.133  They are going to 
                                                          
 130 See Jayda Evans, Summer Storm Brewing, SEATTLE TIMES, May 30, 2000, at D1, 
available at 2000 WL 5538069 (stating that the ABL filed for bankruptcy on Dec. 12, 
1998). 
 131 See id. (reporting that player salaries were the death of the ABL.). 
 132 See Lester Munson & L. Jon Wertheim, Demise of the CBA: Music to their Ears; 
After Selling the Owners on his Plan to Turn the League Around, Isiah Thomas Quickly Led 
the CBA into Bankruptcy, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 9, 2001, available at 2001 WL 
8024730 (describing the demise of the CBA after Isiah Thomas bought the league and 
transformed it into a single entity). 
 133 See Tim Brown, Shaqs Max ONeal Finally Gets His Three-Year, $88.4-Million 
Extension, Answering a lot of Questions about the Future of the Lakers, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 
14, 2000, at D1, available at 2000 WL 25907032; Earl Gustkey, Salary Doesnt Pay in 
WNBA Pro Basketball: Season Starts Today with Players Unhappy They Receive only a 
Third of Earning Potential in Europe, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 2000, at D4, available at 2000 
WL 2245437; Rangers Break the Bank, Sign Alex Rodriguez for Ten                              
Years $252 Million, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Dec. 12, 2000, available at 
http://www.freepress.com/sports/baseball/horn12_20001212.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2002). 
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receive on average something in the range of $50,000 to $60,000.134  
Those figures are a hard pill to swallow and they cause a lot of 
understandable animosity. 
I think the low point for me was when a player thought her agent 
was not doing a very good job, and I was not budging, so she decided 
to put her grandmother on the phone. It was a very unpleasant 
conversation, and the grandmother used words that I had never heard 
my grandparents use.  But it was from the heart.  She tried to explain 
that I did not understand where her granddaughter had come from, 
and I could not possibly understand how hard she had to work to get 
to the level she was at.  She found it unconscionable that her 
granddaughter was not being offered six figures.  It was a very hard 
conversation.  But that is the personal aspect of my job that I hate 
and will always hate, and it is, I think, endemic, as Jeff said, to the 
single-entity structure. 
But there is a more systemic issue with the single-entity structure 
as well.  We have a member of the WNBA Players Association in the 
audience who was on one of the earlier panels here, and I think he 
might tell you that when we go into collective bargaining, we are 
going to be sitting across the tablemyself, the President of the 
WNBA, Val Ackerman,135 and otherswe will be sitting across the 
table from players whose salaries we negotiated. 
In a traditional sports league, in the NBA model, for example, 
those decisions are diffused among the twenty-nine general managers 
and the players are not sitting across the table from the people who 
made those decisions directly.  They are sitting across the table from 
the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner and the General 
Counsel.   
The union may be able to really galvanize and focus the players on 
who the bad guys are when they are sitting directly across the table.  
So I think when we do have collective bargaining negotiations in the 
                                                          
 134 Joanna Cagan, Ballin Abroad: European Pro Leagues Still a Destination for Women 
Hoopsters, VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 24, 2001, available at 2001 WL 9089405 (stating that 
$55,000 is the average salary for a player in the WNBA). 
 135 For a brief biography of Ackerman, see http://www.wnba.com/basics/ackerman 
_bio.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2002). 
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next year or so, it will be interesting to see whether that galvanizing 
effect has an impact and whether it is something that really is not to 
the benefit of the Leaguesigning players directly from the center. 
There has been a lot of discussion about why leagues form as 
single entities.  We put a lot of thought into it.  We did not just 
decide that the single-entity structure is a magic bullet, to use Jeffs 
phrase. 
We formed as a single entity because it more accurately reflected 
the way that we do businessfrom the centerand for the reason 
that Tandy said, to try our best to shrink the target that is on all of 
our backs.  As anybody who has worked for a professional sports 
league knows, that is the antitrust litigation target.  Antitrust 
litigation has become the weapon of choice.  Fortunately, it did not 
work against Major League Soccer, which has somehow been able to 
absorb huge litigation costscosts that I am not sure the WNBA 
could absorb.136  But fortunately we have not had to test that one out 
quite yet. 
The bottom line with respect to a sports league is not whether it is 
a single-entity structure or whether it has a more traditional structure; 
it is the business plan.  A successful league is about getting butts in 
the seats, finding a way to make it work, creating local excitement.  
Everything else flows from that. 
To paraphrase the guy with the Arkansas accent who is living up 
in Chappaqua now: it is the business plan, stupid; it is not the legal 
structure.137 
When you are starting a sports league, the lawyers are the least 
important people in the room.  If you are going to compete in the 
really crowded entertainment marketplace right now, get the lawyers 
out of the picture, and figure out a way to get people interested in 
your product. 
                                                          
 136 Grahame L. Jones, MLS; Jury Rules in Favor of League in Player Suit, L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 12, 2000, at D3 (stating that Major League Soccer won the antitrust lawsuit brought by 
the players). 
 137 Referring to former President Bill Clinton, whose unofficial campaign slogan in 1992 
was, Its the economy, stupid. 
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MR. EDEL: Jamin, thank you. 
I thought what we would do at this point is open up for questions.  
I would like to take the prerogative of the chair to ask the first one.  
Perhaps I should address this specifically to Ken and Jamin, which is 
on Jeffs point: Does the single-entity model reduce entrepreneurial 
zeal?  What we have seen in each example of a single-entity league 
is that the league is losing money.  Some may not survive, some may 
come out of it at some point, but they are losing money.  Is this 
inherent in the single-entity model, and is that a good reason then to 
avoid it? 
MR. SHROPSHIRE: Well, the entrepreneur is the person at the 
top of the league.  That is the person who may or may not come out 
with some funds on top. 
Roller derby, from our childhood, that was the single entity that 
worked.  Every time you saw the New York Bombers and L.A. T-
Birds, they were in the same facility, same people switching teams, 
all in one city.  I do not know who ran the thing, but people 
recognized it as entertainment and were not looking at it for the same 
sort of competition that you look for traditionally in sports. 
But if you take away the individual owners, there may be some 
tweaking that will come up that will give somebody a way to have 
control of a franchise in a way that the fans will recognize.  But so 
far, I do not think anybody has come up with a way.  In the 
traditional model, we are used to seeing teams being led by owners 
that have their own self-interest in winning games. 
MR. DERSHOWITZ: Again, I think it is the business plan.  You 
can accomplish anything if you can get the local buzz.  But I do think 
it is a local business.  I think that is an important thing to discuss.  It 
can be a single entity and still be a local business.  General Motors 
understands that they have to take into account the local dealers and 
let the local dealers make some important decisions about how they 
manufacture and market their cars.  We believe that as well in the 
WNBA. 
Whether we are a single entity or in the case of the NBA, a so-
called traditional sports league, we are going to give a lot of power 
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and a lot of input to the local owners, and we are also going to make 
sure that the fans understand that the local operators on the WNBA 
side, the local owners on the NBA side, have significant input with 
respect to the players and the product on the court.  Nobody seriously 
doubts the competitiveness of WNBA teams, even though the team 
operators do not own the teams. 
As far as turning a profit, again, it is just that there are too many 
leagues starting out in a crowded entertainment marketplace right 
now.  We are about to start another league, the NBDL, the National 
Basketball Developmental League, which we are going to start as a 
single entity as well.  But it is just as crowded a marketplace today, 
and everybody wants to get on the bandwagon, making it very tough. 
I do think that the WNBA will turn a profit in the future, whether 
we are a single entity or not.  I think the marketplace is ready for it, 
and I think the fans are interested and it will take. 
QUESTIONER: Mr. Kessler, you spoke very adamantly about the 
single-entity leagues.  It seems that, while perhaps it may not be the 
optimal structure, it is preferable to not having a league at all.  I was 
wondering if you would speak a moment on whether you think that 
in the absence of the single-entity option, new leagues would even be 
launched, given the risks? 
MR. KESSLER: Absolutely, because if you accept my premise 
that they have a greater chance of generating revenues and fan 
interest if they are not formed as a single entity, then simple 
economics will tell you that they will be more attractive to investors 
and will attract fans with a traditional league structure.  Plenty of 
new leagues have been formed over the years using such a structure.  
That is how you got the American Football League, which eventually 
merged with the NFL.  It was not because it was a single-entity 
structure.  If there is a market and sufficient demand for new leagues, 
and absent some other anticompetitive activities going on, then you 
would expect new leagues to form. 
My main point is if the single-entity structure were efficient, it 
would not be driven by legal advice, which clearly it has been.  If 
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you look through the evidence in the Major League Soccer138 case
and this will all be in the First Circuit brief, so read my brief and you 
will see itthe evidence shows that the decision to form a single 
entity was driven by antitrust advice, it was not driven by economics 
or market forces.  There was a very specific legal reason why the 
MLS ownership wanted to do this. 
I think the whole issue of entrepreneurship is key.  I will use the 
NBA as an example.  Mark Cuban, the owner of the Dallas 
Mavericks, is a Commissioners nightmare.  However, he is 
wonderful for Dallas.  If you look at what has happened in 
attendance in Dallas, in the competitiveness of the Dallas team, it has 
been a brilliant entrepreneurial play in what had been a very 
moribund NBA marketplace.139  Now, Mr. Cuban drives the 
Commissioner crazy.  He is the antithesis of centralized league 
control.  But that is because the NBA is not a single entity.  They do 
not allow for that.  The NBA will have different levels of compliance 
with league rules by different owners, and they are not all going to be 
Mark Cubans.  But the point is that allowing this type of 
independence is a good thing from a product and fan standpoint; it is 
not a bad thing.  The single-entity structure, by contrast, stifles that 
entrepreneurial ability. 
QUESTIONER: This question is directed to Mr. Kessler.  You 
make the argument that the structure of the MLS is adversely 
affecting the product.  But you do not seem to address the issue that 
perhaps the product of soccer in the United States may just be too 
flawed to work.  If we look at the past, in the United States no soccer 
league has ever succeededthe NASL, any indoor soccer league, 
anything else. 
And also, perhaps for start-up leagues in America, there is not the 
market  for them  that people seem to think that there is.    In fact,  no  
                                                          
 138 97 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass. 2000). 
 139 Steve Frank (reporting), Profile: Entrepreneur and Dallas Mavericks Owner Mark 
Cuban, CNBC: Early Today, Apr. 2, 2001, available at 2001 WL 22705370; Barbara 
Barker, Maverick Owner: Hes Not Just About Fines; Billionaire Cuban Turns Dallas, NBA 
Upside Down, NEWSDAY, Feb. 4, 2001, at C8, available at 2001 WL 9215239 (describing 
the success Dallas has encountered since Mark Cuban became the teams owner). 
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start-up league has truly been a stable financial success since the 
NBA really started fifty years ago.  Can you address those concerns? 
MR. KESSLER: Sure.  They just came out with a survey of fan 
interest.  It was published in the most recent Sports Business Journal.  
Professional soccer as a wholethey do not limit it to any league
is more popular among fans in the United States than, for example, 
tennis or golf.  It is not that far below hockey in terms of its level of 
fan interest; in fact, it is quite close to hockey.  It is also quite close 
to some of the college sports.  There is clearly a market and demand 
for professional soccer in this country at a respectable level that can 
more than support it. 
In fact, in the first year of its existence, MLS on its revenue side
and this is in the public recordhad more than $60 million in 
revenue.  That is extremely respectable for the first year of operation. 
So the idea that there is not sufficient demand to support 
professional soccer in the United States is just not correct.  I think 
soccer in this country can succeed.  I think its single-entity structure 
is hurting it, not helping it. 
QUESTIONER: Let me just ask a follow-up to the first issue 
before we address the second issue.  I happen to be a tremendous 
soccer fanEuropean soccer, the top leagues in the world, simply 
because of fan interest and money over there.  I have never attended 
or watched an MLS game in the United States. 
MR. KESSLER: Why not? 
MS. ODONOGHUE: You should. 
MR. SHROPSHIRE: Why not? 
QUESTIONER: A basic lack of interest. 
MR. KESSLER: Why do you lack interest? 
QUESTIONER: I do not know who the players are. 
MR. KESSLER: Ah, okay. 
QUESTIONER: And, in general, the quality of the League is 
simply not the same as it can be in an England, in an Italy, in a 
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Spain, because there is simply so much more money and interest 
there, just as a basketball league in Italy can never achieve what it 
can in the United States, simply because of interest and money. 
MR. KESSLER: If you look at those leagues that you are 
interested in, they all obviously are organized along independent 
ownership where the teams compete.  In fact, in soccer, as you know, 
they have this relegation system, which I actually think is brilliant.  
For those of you who are not soccer fans worldwide, in the second-
tier leagues, the best teams can play their way into the top league, 
and the worst teams in the top league play themselves into the second 
league.  It creates yet another competitive inducement for teams to 
improve themselves and creates tremendous interest for fans. 
You do not know many MLS players in the United States.  That is 
exactly the problem, and that is because the single-entity structure is 
incapable of developing individual player personalities in local 
markets, who fans can identify with on any systematic basis.  In fact, 
the few times that players in MLS have been developed in certain 
markets, they have ended up getting moved by the single entity to 
other franchises, over the protests of the investor-operators who were 
running the teams.  This does not create fan interest.  This is the 
problem. 
MR. EDEL: Tandy? 
MS. ODONOGHUE: Needless to say, I disagree.  The single-
entity structure is not the issue here.  I think that your answer is the 
answer that, unfortunately, Major League Soccer has been hearing.  
It is not, We dont come to your games because you are a single 
entity. It is a difficult proposition.  Soccer clearly in this country is 
not what soccer is in the countries where it is the game. 
England is a perfect example.  I have a hard time imagining that if 
the premier league were to turn into a single entity, people would 
stop going.  I mean, that is what they live for over there. 
I also have a hard time with the fact that the single entity has 
prevented people from learning who Cobi Jones is.140  People here 
                                                          
 140 For a brief biography of Jones, see http://www.lagalaxy.com/roster/cobijones.html 
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may not know who Cobi Jones is, but I think the reason is because 
you are following other sports in a crowded marketplace, you are not 
interested in soccer.  That is part of Major League Soccers problem. 
I think the people at MLS probably shudder at the thought of 
where the league would be were it not a single entity.  The single 
entity has not put the league where it is.  What has put the league 
where it isand the people at MLS know this, and know that these 
are the things they need to work onis difficulty with fan interest, 
regardless of whether a survey says that it is more popular than 
mens golf or womens tennis.141 
If anyone has a chance to go to Columbus, Ohio, I urge you to stop 
by Crew Stadium.142  That is how soccer is intended to be presented 
to its audience, in a small specific stadiumnot at Giants Stadium 
with 76,000 seats, where you only want to fill 20,000 to have your 
ultimate soccer game.  That is how it is meant to be played. 
So there are very specific packaging issues that MLS has faced, it 
knows it is facing them, and it will continue to face themincluding 
educating people about soccer and making the stars known. 
The local operators, in addition to the teams that MLS operates, go 
out of their way to educate their markets about their important 
players.  So there are other struggles there that have nothing to do 
with the single entity.  In fact, I think the single entity is a critical 
part of the reason MLS is still here today, despite the litigation that 
has surrounded it. 
MR. DERSHOWITZ: There are so many ways to have local 
incentives.  Jeff wants player salaries to go through the roof; that is 
his only goalan admirable quest.  But you can create fan 
excitement and you can give local investors all the incentive in the 
world to win by using many different types of mechanisms.  It does 
                                                                                                                                      
(last visited Jan. 5, 2002). 
 141 Soccer is the most popular sport in the world today.  Walton Morais, Brazilian Soccer 
Sensation, BUS. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1999, at 33, available at 1999 WL 27555043. 
 142 Crew Stadium is the only soccer-specific stadium in the United States.  It holds 
22,500 fans very close to the field to keep them in the action.  See Soccers New Work Site, 
at http://www.columbus.org/showcase/crewstadium (last visited Jan. 5, 2002) for more 
information on Crew Stadium. 
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not have to be the traditional joint venture or partnership model.  
You could simply have local incentives, which we have in the 
WNBA, where a lot of local revenue gets retained. You can have 
bonus structures for winning.  There are all kinds of things you can 
do. 
You do not have to dismiss the single-entity structure, as Jeff does, 
just because player salaries do not get A-Roded through the roof 
every time you turn around. 
MR. KESSLER: Actually, the only way player salaries go up 
substantially is if revenues can support it, no matter what model we 
create.  I can have an entirely competitive marketplace, and if there 
are no revenues, then there are not high player salaries, because you 
have to have revenues.  The reason why teams bid for players in the 
competitive marketplace is because they believe the player is going 
to enhance their ability to make more money.  Otherwise, you would 
not bid. 
MR. DERSHOWITZ: What about the Mark Cubans? 
MR. KESSLER: That is a good example. 
MR. DERSHOWITZ: Mark Cuban is doing this because hes got 
play money and he wants to win.  It has nothing to do with revenues. 
MR. KESSLER: I do not agree with that at all.  Look at the 
attendance at his team.  Mark Cuban has made much more money for 
his team this year through his pursuit of players and other 
entrepreneurial activities. 
MR. DERSHOWITZ: No.  He has lost much more money than the 
previous owner.  The reality is he spent money to try to get the buzz 
going, and he has done a heck of a job and we love it.  You say he is 
the Commissioners thorn.  Mark Cuban is doing great things.  I 
mean, do we like it when he jumps on the court?  No. 
MR. KESSLER: Well, then we agree. 
MR. DERSHOWITZ: Yes.  But it is not about revenues with him, 
its toy money, its play money. 
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MR. KESSLER: I think it is about making his team successful.  He 
likes to win, but that is all part of it. 
MR. DERSHOWITZ: Yes.  Nothing to do with revenue. 
MR. EDEL: Why dont we go to the next question, now that we 
seem to have found some common ground here? 
QUESTIONER: Going back to that issue, though, since the 
American Basketball Association was losing millions and had to 
merge with the NBA, the American Football League was losing 
millions and had to merge with the NFLthe World Hockey 
Association, the United States Football League (hereinafter USFL), 
the World Football League, all were traditionally structured leagues; 
they all went out of business.  Isnt it more likely to assume that the 
reason any sports league coming into this marketplace fails is 
because of the competitive nature of the market, not the single-entity 
structure?  And also, dont you think that your lawsuit, which would 
have made the investors liable for triple damages, scared away any 
potential investors in the League for the last four years? 
MR. KESSLER: I doubt it.  The lawsuit could have been settled at 
any time for a fair system for the players.  But the MLS owners are 
not interested in that.  Rather, they are only interested in defending 
the single-entity structure of the League, so that is what we are going 
to have to fight about. 
But the point is, you are quite right, that sports is a competitive 
business.  No one is saying, and I am certainly not saying, that if 
MLS did not have a single entity, it would be guaranteed success.  
However, on balance, the single entity is a negative in their ability to 
succeed, and I think it is a contributor to their lack of success.  But 
you are quite right; MLS owners would still have to compete and be 
successful, with or without it.  The league still needs good owners; it 
still has to have a sound business plan.  I also agree that a business 
plan and leadership are critical at the individual team level in terms 
of making the sport successful.  So no one is saying this would 
guarantee success. 
Now, there are different things going on here, too.  For those 
leagues that you mentioned, there were different things going on in 
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each case.  The American Football League was successful, and that 
was a completely different case from some of the other leagues you 
mentioned.  The USFL was unsuccessful, but it won a 
monopolization case against the NFL, but only won a dollar, so there 
was really a strange set of circumstances there.143  There are a lot of 
different reasons why different leagues failed. 
On the whole, what seems to have worked best, if you look at what 
has proven itself, have been leagues like the NFL and the NBA, 
where you have individually owned and operated teams who 
compete for players; but yes, you also have a certain amount of joint-
venture activity. 
I would not say that all league centralization is bad.  It is subject to 
antitrust review.  But, having joint marketing and promotion, and 
doing the things the leagues do in licensing and business 
development, have generally been good things.  These efforts are 
subject to antitrust review, but they can still be reasonable 
agreements to advance the joint-venture business.  So a complete 
separation in terms of team operations may not be economically 
desirable either.  In fact, I do not think it would be. 
QUESTIONER: Has anyone considered doing it from the other 
direction, starting perhaps as a single entity and then ceding more 
and more rights to individual operators so they almost grow into 
becoming owners, give the league some traction for a few years and 
then start moving toward a more traditional format?  Has anyone 
thought of that, or are there any downfalls there that I am not 
thinking of? 
MR. DERSHOWITZ: We think about it every day.  We are in an 
experimental mode.  We are looking for anything that works.  I think 
it was probably the right decision to initially organize the WNBA as 
a single entity.  Five years from now, it could be, we will shake it up.  
I have no idea. 
                                                          
 143 United States Football League v. Natl Football League, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 
1988). 
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QUESTIONER: I mean, would it be an instant switch, or are you 
considering, like I said, slowly ceding more power to the individual 
operators? 
MR. DERSHOWITZ: We are also considering more 
centralization.  This is a business where we are open to any kind of 
suggestions to make this thing work.  I do not think anybody has 
thought about blowing up the model completely, but if we can think 
of a way to make this thing profitableimprove the P&Lswe 
would do it in an instant. 
QUESTIONER: In the effort to keep salaries down, given the fact 
that this is sort of a global enterprisewith the exception of the 
WNBA, because womens opportunities are so smalldo you think 
that you may be blowing the opportunity to take it to the next level, 
in that if you look at where a lot of the NHL talent is coming from 
right now, it is coming from abroad because they pay more and it is a 
higher value for the players.  Or if you look at the NBA, 
increasingly, the NBA rosters are filled out by international players; 
they are still predominantly Americans, but there is some very strong 
international talent. 
You look at soccer, though, and the game is far stronger abroad.  
Why in the world would somebody who is playing with one of the 
premier leagues down in Brazil or in Germany come to play in the 
United States when their salary may shrink in fact,144 in terms of 
endorsements and all that?  Without that buzz, do you think that you 
may not be attracting the talent which does then pull the fans like 
that, and say, Well, hey, you know what?  Im going to go watch the 
German game today. 
MS. ODONOGHUE: Well, I think that is certainly an issue when 
you really have hard-core soccer fans who are very interested in the 
European and the South American games.  But part of MLSs focus 
has always been to develop American players, and it is doing so.  
There are some really young players that it has worked with  
                                                          
 144 See Sullivan, supra note 61, at 902 (MLS has a difficult time keeping players because 
they do not pay as much as European soccer teams even if the European soccer team is in a 
second- or third-division league). 
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extensively, and it also has a specific program, Project Forty, which 
develops young players.145 
You are right, though.  You recognize a key issue.  There are 
limited funds and you cannot go out and afford every star player.  
Even if you only want a limited number of those high-caliber 
European players or South American players, you cannot afford all 
of them.  In fact, probably the costliest of the costliest you cannot 
afford at all.  So you have to make those business judgments about 
where you are going to spend your money. 
QUESTIONER: I have a follow-up.  Even if you take the 
developmental nature of American soccer, why do you end up with 
the dynamics where you have millions of American kids playing 
soccer,146 but at some point in time when they reach a level of talent 
at a little bit older age, a bunch of them switch over to other more 
lucrative sports?  So you may have fantastic athletes who at the high 
school level all of a sudden start to play basketball or football. 
And also, if you look at the American stars that have developed, 
they have not developed through the American competition.  They 
are predominantly stars who have developed in the international 
competition as well as the United States such as Cobi Jones,147 and 
Alexi Lalas.148 
MS. ODONOGHUE: Well, if you look at Cobi and Alexi, those 
are two players who predate MLS, so they certainly started to 
develop before MLS was around, and they are definitely a product of 
being part of the national team. 
                                                          
 145 Project Forty is a developmental program funded by MLS to develop players selected 
by teams through the MLS draft, or if signed after the draft, through a lottery system.  See 
Kevin Coleman, Trade Winds Blow Through MLS, Too: Single-Entity Structure Doesnt 
Hinder Movement, DENVER POST, July 2, 2001, available at 2001 WL 6756205. 
 146 According to the Soccer Industry Council of America, the number of youths (under 
nineteen years old) registered to play is 3.6 million, a figure that has grown at a rate of 
eight-to-ten percent annually between 1990 and 2000.  See Haya El Nasser, Commotion 
Kicking Up Over Space for Soccer, USA TODAY, June 16, 1999, at 17A, available at 1999 
WL 6845590. 
 147 See supra note 140. 
 148 For a brief biography of Lalas, see http://www.lagalaxy.com/roster/alexilalas.html 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2002). 
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But if you are talking about the kids right now that are twelve, 
thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, I think that is where MLSs real 
opportunity is.  By demonstrating to them that, We now have a 
place for you to play, so we are encouraging you stick with soccer; 
sure, play your other sports, but now you have a place to come to, 
instead of abandoning the sport or thinking Okay, I am going to do 
my best, but then I will go play overseas, MLS is making every 
effort to hold on to the talented American players. 
By the same token, there are those players who it is simply not in a 
position to get at all, the younger stars on the national team who 
bypass MLS altogether and simply go straight to Europe.  It is a 
matter of getting the League more on par with the European 
competition.  That is coming.  It is going to take a little while. 
But I think certainly the youth concentration and focusing on 
making an effort to tell those players, Develop, we have an interest 
in you, we have a place for you, is going to be turning around in a 
couple of years.  You know, Bobby Convey, he is a great example.  
If you take an interest in a younger kid who is obviously very 
talented and make it clear that he will have a place to play, you have 
a good shot of not losing him. 
MR. KESSLER: Virtually every MLS player you could mention 
who anybody would have heard of in the United States as a famous 
U.S. player has been developed by the national teamwhere there 
is, by the way, a sense of individual player identity, an organization 
which develops and promotes players and people get interested in 
them.  You cannot name an MLS player who has developed or 
become known just for being an MLS player.  They are all from 
somewhere else.  That is the problem. 
QUESTIONER: Josh Wolff.149 
MS. ODONOGHUE: Thank you. 
QUESTIONER: Josh Wolff made his splash at the Olympics.  He 
is totally American. 
                                                          
 149 For a brief biography of Wolff, see http://www.mlsnet.com/bios/josh_wolff.html (last 
visited Jan. 5, 2002). 
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MR. KESSLER: Where did he make a splash? 
QUESTIONER: At the Olympics. 
MR. KESSLER: Yes.  And how did he become known?  In the 
Olympics, right? 
QUESTIONER: But how did he develop? 
MS. ODONOGHUE: How did he develop?  In MLS. 
MR. KESSLER: I am not saying you cannot develop your soccer 
skills in the MLS single-entity structure.  There is a difference 
between becoming a skilled player and becoming a marketable 
player that will attract fans in this country on any kind of base broad 
enough that many people will know who Josh Wolff is.  In this room, 
it is probably only a minority who ever heard of Josh Wolff, as 
would be the case throughout the country. 
But the point is you have got to have a structure where players are 
promoted.  One of the brilliant things that David Stern recognized a 
long time ago is that the players are the game.  When the players 
became the focus of the NBAs marketing and the teams individual 
promotions the NBA took off as an enterprise.  That is what, for 
better or worse, American fans identify withpeople, human beings 
and individuality. 
It will be interesting to see what happens with womens soccer, 
because in womens soccer, you have a group of people who are 
relatively well known from the national team and from the World 
Cup, and they are going to be put into a single-entity League again.  
We will see what happens.  It will be very interesting to see whether 
the league structure enhances their appeal or diminishes their appeal.  
I am interested to see that. 
MR. EDEL: And on that note, I want to thank you all for your 
participation.  I know I speak on behalf of everybody here when I say 
that we all found it to be very stimulating. 
 
 
 
